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[T]hese changes come at the end of a continuous process of tinker-
ing, minor adaptations, temporary expedients, proposals for major
reforms giving rise to influential debates—all the reflexes of the
creaking of the judicial machinery because of its inadequacy to cope
with the demands made upon it by changing circumstances.
. . . .
. . .  Congressional preoccupation with judicial organization is ex-
tremely tenuous all through our history except after needs have
gone unremedied for so long a time as to gather compelling momen-
tum . . . .1
The words of Justice Frankfurter and his colleague James Lan-
dis, written nearly seventy years ago to describe the incredible Con-
gressional inertia that had to be overcome to institute much-needed
federal judicial reform, are just as applicable to the condition of the
United States Courts of Appeals today.  The modern circuit courts of
appeals, created by the Evarts Act2 in 1891 to relieve a severely over-
burdened Supreme Court, are faced with a similar dilemma: Appel-
late dockets are swelling at a rate that outstrips the ability of the
larger circuits to keep pace.  Our current federal lawmakers face a
judicial situation that has been met by previous Congresses with too
much deliberation and too little action.  This hesitancy to change the
structure of the American federal judiciary has led repeatedly to the
1. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:
A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 30, 36 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons Inc. 1993) (1927).
2. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 [hereinafter Evarts Act].  For further discus-
sion of the Evarts Act, see infra text accompanying notes 102-08.
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dangerous accumulation of unmet needs of which Landis and Frank-
furter wrote.
The explosion of appellate litigation in the United States over
the past twenty-five years has contributed to the current caseload cri-
sis.  There are multiple causes for the increase in appeals; among the
contributing factors are the rise in prisoner litigation3 and the reduc-
tion of certainty in predicting appellate outcomes produced by larger
courts with more possible three-judge panels.4  The Congressional re-
sponse to the rise in federal appellate litigation thus far has been to
keep adding judges to the circuits.  The Ninth Circuit, already the
largest with twenty-eight judgeships, will soon expand to thirty-eight
as a result of Congress’ latest attempt to alleviate the nation’s largest
appellate caseload.5  The Ninth Circuit itself has instituted a number
of internal reforms in the past ten years, including sophisticated com-
3. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 213 tbl.341 (115th ed. 1995) (reporting that the number of prisoner consti-
tutional claims has climbed from 218 cases in 1966 to 56,283 cases in 1994).
4. See Paul D. Carrington, U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts: Relationships
in the Future, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 69, 74
(1989) [hereinafter Relationships in the Future].  Specifically, Carrington states:
Lawyers afflicted with greater difficulty in predicting appellate outcomes are
likely also to experience greater difficulty in settling cases.  The durability or nonset-
tlement of civil disputes turning on nonfactual issues appears to have increased sig-
nificantly over the last 30 years.  This partly explains the much greater increase in
appeals than in trials.
Id. Carrington also attributes the lack of certainty to the loosening of the strictures of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which creates a “lack of confidence of lawyers in their own judg-
ment as to what is truly groundless in the minds of an unidentified and diverse panel of circuit
judges.” Id.; see also infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
5. See 139 CONG. REC. E3046 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993) (extension of remarks of Rep.
Kopetski).  It must be noted, however, that the Ninth Circuit currently has only 18 active
judges.  See Rehnquist’s Aim Is True, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1998, at B4.  Ninth Circuit Chief
Judge Proctor Hug, Jr. has said that he had to cancel hearings in 600 cases in 1997 “because no
judges were available.”  Id.  One of every ten federal judgeships is vacant nationwide; 101
judges were confirmed by the Senate in 1994, but only 43 in 1996 and 1997 combined.  See id.
Most observers attribute this delay to partisan politics and the Senate Judiciary Committee.
The Committee’s chairman, Orrin Hatch, has conceded that the backup is at least partly due to
the Republican perception that President Clinton’s nominees will be “too activist.”  Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). United States Supreme Court Chief Justice William
Rehnquist has come out sharply against this delay, publicly criticizing Hatch, a former political
ally.  See id.  The lag in federal judicial appointments is viewed by some prominent observers as
having contributed to the backlog of cases in the Ninth Circuit.  As Chief Judge Hug, a vehe-
ment opponent of circuit-splitting, put it recently, “[s]hortly after I came onto the court in 1978,
our authorized judges were 23 to handle 3,100 cases [a year].  Today, we have 18 active judges
to handle 8,600 cases.”  David G. Savage, Plan to Break Up Court Assailed; House to Take Up
Bill This Week,  SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at A4.
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puter tracking systems and the delegation of work to staff attorneys.6
These reforms are merely stopgap measures that mask a much
deeper problem; instead of creating an ever-larger circuit with an in-
creasingly monolithic infrastructure, Congress and the Ninth Circuit
Judicial Council should realize that the circuit is simply too large to
handle a caseload that is growing with no end in sight.7  The solution
lies in reducing, not increasing, the number of people served by the
circuit.  This can best be accomplished through circuit division.
The most recent division of a federal circuit occurred in 1981,
when the Fifth Circuit was split to create a new Eleventh Circuit.8
This split has been an enormous success.9  The division of the Fifth
Circuit was recommended by the Commission on the Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System (popularly known as the Hruska
Commission).10  At the same time the Commission made its recom-
mendations regarding the Fifth Circuit, it advised then-President
Nixon and the Congress that the Ninth Circuit should be split in or-
6. For a comprehensive look at these reforms, see generally Arthur Hellman’s excellent
collection of essays entitled RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990).
7. One possible approach for reducing the caseload of all federal circuits could be a sub-
stantive reform of federal jurisdiction.  However, this is unlikely to happen on any scale broad
enough to effect the necessary caseload reduction.  Although the increase in the amount in con-
troversy requirement for diversity suits to $75,000 is a solid example of a Congressional reform
designed to reduce the federal caseload, such streamlining measures are counterbalanced by
the enactment of laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, which defines “disability”
broadly and “provides a wide array of remedies enforceable in [federal] courts.”  Arthur D.
Hellman, The Crisis in the Circuits and the Innovations of the Browning Years, in RE-
STRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 8-9 & nn.10-11 (concluding that “Congress will take no
major steps to reduce the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”  Id. at 8.).
8. Prior to the split in 1981, the Fifth Circuit included Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ala-
bama, Georgia, and Florida.  The Eleventh Circuit was produced by carving out Alabama,
Georgia, and Florida.
9. See Conrad Burns, Dividing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: A Proposition Long
Overdue, 57 MONT. L. REV. 245, 254 (1996) (observing that in 1995 the 29 judges of the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits combined disposed of more than double the number of cases that the 26
judges of the Fifth Circuit resolved in the year before the Fifth Circuit split).
10. See Commission on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., The Geographical
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223, 230-
34 (1973) [hereinafter Hruska Commission Report]. The Commission, chaired by Senator Ro-
man Hruska, was created by Congress in 1972.  Due to the “urgency of the need for relief”
from the heavy caseloads of the courts of appeals, Congress ordered that the Commission pre-
pare its report within 180 days.  See id. at 228.  The Commission was “‘to study the present divi-
sion of the United States into the several judicial circuits and to report . . . its recommendations
for changes in the geographical boundaries of the circuits as may be most appropriate for the
expeditious and effective disposition of judicial business.’”  Id. (quoting Act of Oct. 13, 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-489, § 1(a), 86 Stat. 807, 807 (1973)).
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der to deal with many of the same problems hampering the circuit’s
effectiveness today.11
The principal problem facing the Ninth Circuit is its staggering
caseload, 60% of which comes from California.12  The Hruska Com-
mission recommended that California be split between the Ninth Cir-
cuit (which would consist of the Northern and Eastern Districts of
California, Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Hawaii,
and Guam) and a new Twelfth Circuit (comprising the Southern and
Central Districts of California, Arizona, and Nevada).13  Although
Congress did not adopt the Hruska Commission’s proposal, it re-
mains the best of the several alternatives for splitting the Ninth Cir-
cuit because it is the only proposal that would evenly divide the cur-
rent caseload between the two new circuits.
Despite many administrative reforms approved by Congress in
the twenty-three years since the Hruska Commission’s report, the
Ninth Circuit remains the largest, slowest, and most unwieldy of the
federal courts of appeals, handling 20% of the entire federal case-
load.14  The nine states and two territories of the Ninth Circuit cover
fourteen million square miles (an area larger in size than western
Europe)15 with a population of forty-five million people, sixteen mil-
lion more people than are served by any other circuit.16  The territory
of the Ninth Circuit stretches from the Rocky Mountains to the Sea
of Japan, from the Mexican border to the Arctic Circle.17  The influx
of immigrants into the western states will continue to fuel significant
population growth in the states of the Ninth Circuit; the population
of California alone is expected to reach 49.3 million by the year
2025.18 
11. See id. at 234-35.  In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, however, the old Fifth Circuit ap-
pears to have been more amenable to symmetrical division in terms of equitable caseloads, the
number of states involved, and a more obvious geographical split.
12. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 106 (1995) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS].
13. See Hruska Commission Report, supra note 10, at 236.  The Northern Mariana Islands
were not part of the Ninth Circuit when the Report was compiled.
14. See Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Study Commission: Now What?, 57
MONT. L. REV. 313, 314 (1996).
15. See Opinion: Seeking Justice, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 24, 1997, at B7.
16. See Burns, supra note 9, at 250.
17. See O’Scannlain, supra note 14, at 314.
18. See Haya El Nasser, Immigration to Lead Population Boom in West: Census Predicts
California Will Grow 56% by 2025, USA TODAY, Oct. 23, 1996, at 7A; see also S. REP. NO.
104-197, at 9 (1995) (statement of Ninth Circuit Judge O’Scannlain) (“In light of the demo-
graphic trends in our country, it is clear that the population of the states in the [N]inth [C]ircuit,
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The delays, inconsistencies, and impracticalities inherent in an
appellate court the size of the Ninth Circuit point to the need for ac-
tion.  Operating in the measured way that it has since long before the
days of Justice Frankfurter, the Senate, in 1995, reached a compro-
mise with regard to the future of the Ninth Circuit; Senate Bill 956
was transformed from the Ninth Circuit Reorganization Act to a bill
to establish a “Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals.”19  In a rare legislative concession to expediency
in judicial matters, the bill called for the Commission to submit its
report by February 28, 1997.20  Regrettably, the House of Representa-
tives failed to approve the Commission before the end of the term.
On January 30, 1997, Senator Diane Feinstein of California intro-
duced Senate Bill 248, which revived the notion of the Commission
and requested a $1.3 million budget for a study of the federal courts
system to be completed within two years.21  This bill also died, as did
Feinstein’s third attempt to establish a study commission.22  On July
25, 1997, in a 55-45 vote along party lines, the Senate defeated Fein-
stein’s final study proposal in favor of a highly controversial rider to
an appropriations bill which called for a split of the Ninth Circuit into
two circuits, a new Ninth comprising California, Nevada, Guam, and
the Northern Mariana Islands, and a Twelfth made up of Alaska,
Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington.23  At-
taching a circuit-splitting proposal to a spending bill was an unprece-
dented move which forced the issue to be voted upon in the appro-
priations process; the White House “‘strongly object[ed]’ to attaching
the reorganization [plan] to a spending bill.”24
This move by the Senate set the stage for an eventual confronta-
tion in a House-Senate conference committee between pro-split sena-
tors and members of the House, which passed by voice vote a popular
bill (sponsored by Rep. Henry Hyde) that would appoint a commis-
and thus the caseload of the federal judiciary sitting in those states, will continue to increase at
a rate significantly ahead of most other regions of the country.”)
19. See S. 956, 104th Cong. (1996).  The bill made particular reference to the Ninth Circuit
and directed the Commission to recommend appropriate changes in circuit boundaries to the
President and Congress.  See id. § 1(b).
20. See id. § 6.
21. See 143 CONG. REC. S1113-14 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1997) (remarks of Sen. Feinstein).
22. See David Whitney, 9th Circuit Split Clears Roadblock, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
July 25, 1997, at A1.
23. See id.
24. Id.
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sion to study the federal appellate courts as a whole.25  On October 1,
1997, during the Senate appropriations voting for fiscal 1998, the
Senate passed H.R. 2267, the House’s companion measure to the
Senate’s appropriations bill.26  Shortly thereafter, however, passage of
the bill was vitiated and a vote on the Senate’s plan to split the Ninth
Circuit was “indefinitely postponed.”27  Thus, after all of the contro-
versy surrounding the rider to the appropriations bill, action on split-
ting the circuit was, once again, delayed.
The time for change in the Ninth Circuit is ripe;28 indeed, some
judges on the circuit have come to this conclusion.29  While the Senate
broke with its long tradition of delay in circuit-splitting matters with
its dramatic appropriations rider, it acted too quickly and for the
wrong reasons.  The proposal is borne of frustration with the circuit’s
perceived liberal leanings and, by the admission of one of its prime
proponents, Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), of a feeling on the part
of the northwestern states that “the [Ninth Circuit] is undeniably
dominated by urban judges, urban issues, and California, a place
viewed with great disdain in much of the West.”30
25. See id.
26. See 143 CONG. REC. S10,265 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1997).  The Senate struck all text after
the enacting clause and inserted the text of S. 1022, see id., which had passed on July 29, 1997,
section 305 of which contains the amendment splitting the Ninth Circuit.  See 143 CONG. REC.
S8228, S8240-41 (daily ed. July 29, 1997).  The Senate insisted upon inclusion of this amend-
ment.  See 143 CONG. REC. S10,265 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1997).
27. 143 CONG. REC.  D1042-02, D1042 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1997).
28. As Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) put it, “we’ve studied this matter to death . . . .
Every Congress we hear the same thing from the large delegation in the House and the two
senators from California—we need more study.  I’m a California lawyer.  In all sincerity, I can-
not believe we can continue this situation.”  Whitney, supra note 22, at A1.
29. See Diarmuid O’Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Is Inevitable, But Not Imminent, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 948 (1995).  United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, a for-
mer California lawyer and Ninth Circuit judge, told the Senate Appropriations Committee in
April of 1997 that he has “increasing doubts and increasing reservations about the wisdom of
retaining the 9th Circuit in its historic size, and with its historic jurisdiction . . . .  I think institu-
tionally, and from the collegial standpoint, that it is too large to have the discipline and control
that’s necessary for an effective circuit.”  David Whitney, Justice Kennedy Favors Split of 9th
Circuit, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 20, 1997, at B1.
30. Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 27, 1997) (transcript avail-
able at 1997 WL 12823009); see also Senate OKs 9th Circuit Split on Party-Line Vote, NEWS
TRIB. (Tacoma), July 25, 1997, at B4  (quoting Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.): “Is this being
done because Montana doesn’t like a mining decision? . . . Is this being done because Washing-
ton state doesn’t like a timber decision?”).  Senator Stevens, Chairman of the Senate Appro-
priations Committee, was angered by a December 1996 Ninth Circuit opinion which expanded
the power of Indian villages in Alaska to claim sovereign rights.  Stevens, therefore, allowed
the inclusion of a provision to break up the Ninth Circuit in the annual spending bill of the judi-
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While the House’s study proposal is a laudable suggestion, the
problem of California will not go away as commission after commis-
sion ponders the fate of the courts of appeals.  With the possibility of
ten more judgeships looming on the horizon, there is real danger that
the Ninth Circuit will become less consistent in its application of  the
law and less able to give the parties before it the full measure of jus-
tice to which they are entitled.31
This Note examines the past and future of the Ninth Circuit,
placing the court within its historical context as it prepares for the
twenty-first century.  Part I looks at the development of the circuit
court system, beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, through
changes instituted by the Evarts Act, continuing to the present. Part
II analyzes some of the problems facing the Ninth Circuit, many of
which have already been alluded to in the Introduction.  Part III pre-
sents the major proposals for division of the Ninth Circuit, and ex-
plains why the Hruska Commission’s proposal (with some modifica-
tions) remains the best plan for division of the circuit.
I.  ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS
“Familiarity with political institutions breeds indifference to their
origin.  Never having been without inferior federal courts, we as-
sume their inevitability.”32
So much attention has been focused over the past twenty-five to
thirty years on the future of the American federal appellate system
that it has become easy to forget its past.  An examination of the fac-
tors that precipitated the inception of the system can illuminate the
essential considerations for policymakers as the Ninth Circuit at-
tempts to address the difficulties presented by its burgeoning
caseload.
ciary.   See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1997, S. 1022, 105th Cong.
§ 305; Savage, supra note 5, at A4.
31. Judge Gerald Tjoflat, former Chief Judge of the Eleventh Circuit, has written that
“judges in small circuits are able to interact with their colleagues in a more expedient and effi-
cient manner than judges on jumbo courts.”  Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, 79
A.B.A. J. 70, 70 (1993).  Irving Kaufman, former Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, has said
that “[a]dditional judgeships are both an inefficient use of scant judicial resources and a disrup-
tive influence on the development of the law.”  Id. at 71.  Chief Justice Rehnquist has advo-
cated a cap of 1,000 Article III judges to “enable the federal courts to maintain their high qual-
ity, cohesiveness and effectiveness.”  Id.
32. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 4.
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The circuit courts of appeals can trace their origins back to the
Judiciary Act of 1789, by which Congress “establish[ed] the Judicial
Courts of the United States” pursuant to the mandate granted to it by
Article III of the Constitution.33  Like the Constitution, the Judiciary
Act was a response to concerns that arose during the period of the
Articles of Confederation: Fears of parochialism in the state courts
(of particular concern to merchants who traded in different states) as
well as the need for uniform application of maritime commerce laws
led to an agreement between Federalists and Anti-Federalists to es-
tablish a national court system.34
The Judiciary Act divided the twelve states in the Union at the
time into thirteen districts, each with a district court having original
jurisdiction.35  Part of this jurisdiction was exclusive of the state courts
and part was concurrent.36  The Act also divided the nation into three
circuits: Southern (the Carolinas and Georgia), Eastern (New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York) and Middle (New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia).37  The cir-
cuit courts created by the Judiciary Act were quite different from the
federal circuit courts that exist today. These courts had original juris-
diction, concurrently with the state and district courts, of all diversity
cases in which the amount in controversy exceeded $500.38  Addition-
ally, the circuit courts also were given original jurisdiction over all
civil suits at common law in which an alien was a party and the
amount in controversy exceeded $500.39  The circuit courts did per-
33. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 73 [hereinafter Judiciary Act of 1789].
34. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 8-9.  Indeed, as Alexander Hamilton
wrote:
The power of constituting inferior courts is evidently calculated to obviate the neces-
sity of having recourse to the Supreme Court in every case of federal cognizance.  It
is intended to enable the national government to institute or authorize, in each State
or district of the United States, a tribunal competent to the determination of matters
of national jurisdiction within its limits.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 481, 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
35. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 38 (1953).
36. See id. at 38-39.  The district courts were given only a very limited criminal jurisdiction;
they became, essentially, the maritime and admiralty courts of the federal system, while the
circuit courts primarily handled cases arising under diversity of citizenship.  See FRANKFURTER
& LANDIS, supra note 1, at 12.
37. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 4, 1 Stat. at 74.  The district courts of Maine and Kentucky
were given the same jurisdiction as the circuit courts, except appeals from these courts went
straight to the Supreme Court.  See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 77-78.
38. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 39.
39. See id.
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form an appellate function: They had authority to review, on writ of
error, final decisions of the district courts in civil cases with more
than fifty dollars at stake, and to review on appeal all maritime and
admiralty cases in which the amount in controversy exceeded $300.40
Most of the early district courts had a single judge; there was lit-
tle supervision over judges built into the federal system.41  Thus, there
were elements of both Federalism and Anti-Federalism in the new
courts: The federal court system would exist separately from the state
courts, providing a forum insulated from the local prejudices that the
Federalists feared, yet the decentralized, hierarchical structure of the
new system reflected more Anti-Federalist themes of independence,
decentralization, and individualism.42
Atop the system created by the Act sat the Supreme Court, with
a Chief Justice and five associate Justices.43  This Court, the only tri-
bunal specifically mandated by Article III, was the court of final re-
view in the federal system.44  In addition to performing the duties that
arose under the Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction, each Jus-
tice was required to “ride circuit.” Circuit courts included one district
court judge and two Supreme Court Justices (“Circuit Justices”), who
were required to sit twice a year in each district located within their
circuits.45  This system, considered by the framers as integral to the
successful operation of the federalism they envisioned, quickly be-
came the bane of the Supreme Court Justices’ existences.  Although
each Congress was peppered with complaints from Justices about the
time-consuming and exhausting travel schedules precipitated by the
circuit-riding requirement, these duties remained (technically, at
least) a part of the judicial system until 1891.46
40. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 21, 1 Stat. at 83-84.
41. See PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 6-
7 (1973).
42. See id.
43. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 1, 1 Stat. at 73.
44. See FISH, supra note 41, at 4.  The Supreme Court had original jurisdiction: 1) in all
cases in which a state was a party, except those between a state and its citizens; 2) in suits
against ambassadors or other public ministers; and 3) in all suits brought by ambassadors and
public ministers.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 41.  The Court could review deci-
sions of the circuit courts in civil cases in which the amount in controversy exceeded $2000;
there was no provision for appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases.  See id.  The Court was
also granted appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the highest courts of the states (a Fed-
eralist victory) and federal question jurisdiction.  See id.
45. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 11.
46. See FISH, supra note 41, at 352.  It is interesting to note that vestiges of this system re-
main: Each Justice of the Supreme Court is still assigned to one or more circuits, see 117 S. Ct.
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The notion of circuit-riding was the lynchpin of the old circuit
court system.  The idea of keeping the Justices of the highest court in
the land apprised of the laws of the nation was firmly rooted in some
of the concerns of federalism, which survive to this day.  Such a
means of keeping the unreviewable, highest court in the land (a pow-
erful symbol of the federal government’s power) in touch with the
states was received positively by the states.
The expansion of the nation exposed circuit-riding’s fundamen-
tal strengths and weaknesses: As the federal system became respon-
sible for awareness of the law of an expanding number of states, the
need for a high court with ultimate control over the interpretation of
the laws of a rapidly-changing nation became increasingly apparent.
Conversely, the idyllic concept of Justices roaming the land to famil-
iarize themselves with the nuances of frontier justice became a prac-
tical nightmare that worsened as America expanded westward.
The Justices’ distaste for their circuit-riding duties was unani-
mous, and it became the focus of numerous unsuccessful attempts in
Congress to eliminate this onerous responsibility.  Senator Bucha-
nan’s comments from 1826 characterize the typical Congressional re-
sponse:
By compelling the Judges of the Supreme Court to [ride circuit], the
knowledge they have acquired of the local laws will be retained and
improved, and they will thus be enabled, not only the better to ar-
rive at correct results themselves, but to aid their brethren of the
Court who [serve] different Circuits and are, of course, deprived of
an opportunity to acquire such information, except in that manner.47
The solution to the problem of retaining the federalist ideal
while adapting the courts to geographical reality was the principal
problem of judicial administration for Congress in the 1800s.48  As
Professor Peter Fish points out, these problems of federalism advan-
taged the Anti-Federalists’ ideals: As the country became more de-
centralized and the Justices of the Supreme Court found themselves
less able to perform their circuit duties, the district judges became in-
9-10 (1996) (listing the circuit assignments of Justices), and Justices often attend the annual ju-
dicial conferences of their circuits.
47. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 16 n.44 (quoting 2 CONG. DEB. 416
(1826)).
48. See FISH, supra note 41, at 12-13.
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creasingly important and, in some cases, extremely powerful.49  In
many cases, these judges rendered final decisions,50 and some feared
that the low salaries paid to district judges were insufficient to attract
judges of quality to the bench.51
The first Congressional revision of the circuit system came in
1793, when the number of Supreme Court Justices for each circuit
was reduced to one.52  This measure was more symbolic than effec-
tive; the Justices were still faced with arduous journeys to their re-
spective circuits, and their docket back in Washington continued to
swell.53
49. See id.  Indeed, many federal districts had only one judge who, as the Supreme Court’s
docket grew larger, became the arbiter of last resort in the majority of cases.  See id.
They became lions on their relatively remote thrones.  However they might find or
make the law, delay or accelerate the flow of cases, reward or punish friends and foes
with patronage and favorable bench rulings, concerned none but themselves.
Only . . . reversals on points of law and [the possibility of] impeachment . . . limited
their conduct.
Id.
50. See id. at 13.
51. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 18 n.49.
52. See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333.
53. Lest it be thought that circuit-riding was a completely negative experience for the Jus-
tices, it should be mentioned that they used these opportunities to impress the populace with
their superior legal knowledge: Justices Jay and Iredell delivered “eloquent” speeches (under
the pretext of charges to the grand jury) that were enthusiastically reported far and wide.  See
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 20.  An early account of a circuit-riding visit to a
New Hampshire town by Justice William Paterson serves well to illustrate this point:
On Monday last the Circuit Court of the United States was opened in this town.  The
Hon. Judge Paterson presided.  After the jury was impaneled the judge delivered a
most elegant and appropriate charge.  The law was laid down in a most masterly
manner.  Politics were set in their true light by holding up the Jacobins as the disor-
ganizers of our happy country and the only instruments of introducing discontent and
dissatisfaction among the well-meaning parts of the community.  Religion and mo-
rality were pleasingly inculcated and enforced as being necessary to good govern-
ment, good order, and good laws; for “when the righteous are in authority, the peo-
ple rejoice.”
We are sorry that we could not prevail upon the honorable judge to furnish a
copy of said charge to adorn the pages of the United States Oracle.
Robert W. Breckons, The Judicial Code of the United States with Some Incidental Observations
on Its Application to Hawaii, 22 YALE L.J. 453, 454 (1913) (quoting a town newspaper’s ac-
count of Paterson’s visit).
Sometimes, however, the Justices took the bully pulpit presented by the grand jury a
little too far.  In 1803, Justice Samuel Chase told a Baltimore grand jury that Maryland’s new
law abolishing property qualifications for voting rights would result in the destruction of liberty
and property rights. JANE SHAFFER ELSMERE, JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE 162 (1980).  Justice
Chase was also reported to have made a political attack against President Thomas Jefferson
during this grand jury charge, prompting Jefferson to suggest that the House of Representa-
tives impeach Chase.  See id.  The grand jury charge became the basis of a charge of “seditious
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The Justices got a full, if short-lived, reprieve by virtue of the
Federalist judiciary-stacking scheme promulgated by the Act of Feb-
ruary 13, 1801 (which gave rise to the seminal Marbury v. Madison54
decision): The Act abolished circuit-riding and created sixteen new
federal court judgeships.55  This law, which flooded the newly recon-
stituted federal judiciary with John Adams’s infamous “Midnight
Judges,” was repealed after Thomas Jefferson took office.56  The Jef-
fersonian Congress moved quickly to institute other reforms.  The na-
tion was divided into six circuits, with a new Supreme Court Justice
for each of the three new circuits.57  A new Supreme Court seat would
be created for each new circuit thereafter.58  As before, the circuits
would be manned by one district court judge and one Circuit
(Supreme Court) Justice, but the Act provided that the courts could
be run by a single judge if the Circuit Justice was unable to attend.59
Each Justice was to hold court once a year in each district within his
circuit, but as the Justices became less able to fulfill this duty, the cir-
cuit courts were increasingly operated by the district judges.60
For the next three decades, Congress wrangled over various pro-
posals to revise the federal judiciary: There were the inevitable bills
introduced to abolish circuit-riding and bills quibbling over the pre-
cise makeup of the westernmost circuits, but, despite lively debates in
the House and Senate, this period was ultimately one of inertia dur-
ing which no substantive reforms were enacted.61  The only significant
change to come out of these years was the first of several lengthen-
criticism,” one of the eight charges brought in Chase’s impeachment, which was ultimately un-
successful.  See id.
54. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
55. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, §§ 1-3, 2 Stat. 89, 89 (delineating the duties of Justices
and omitting any obligation for them to ride circuit).
56. See Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132.
57. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157-58.
58. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 32.  In 1807, the Seventh Circuit was
formed to serve Tennessee, Kentucky and Ohio, and a seventh Justice was added to the Su-
preme Court.  See id. at 34.
59. See id. at 31-32.
60. See id.  The circuit work was often more substantial and challenging for the district
judges than was their district duty.  See FISH, supra note 41, at 13 n.54.
61. For a discussion of this period, see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 34-40.
Powerful forces still argued for retention of the circuit-riding system, as illustrated by Senator
Buchanan’s remarks: “[T]he time will come when the Judges of the Supreme Court shall not be
able to perform both their appellate and Circuit Court duties: necessity will then compel their
separation.  The day, however, I trust, is far distant.  I am willing to delay that event as long as
possible . . . .”  2 CONG. DEB. 925 (1826).
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ings of the Supreme Court session: The Act of May 4, 1826 added a
month to the session, which began each year on the first Monday of
February.62  This measure helped the Court address its backlog of
cases, but it further inhibited the Justices’ ability to meet their circuit
obligations.63
During this static period in the development of the federal judi-
cial structure, significant changes were occurring in the United States:
Shipping was becoming more sophisticated and capable of delivering
goods to more places in less time, and more states were being added
to the Union. Manufacturing took hold in the North and cotton be-
came a booming business in the South. This growth in the size and
complexity of the economy led to higher caseloads in the nation’s
courts.64  In 1837, Congress responded (too late, in the eyes of many
commentators) to the further expansion of the nation in terms of size
and litigiousness by creating the Eighth and Ninth circuits and adding
two new Supreme Court Justices.65  The Justices were not placated by
this turn of events and responded to a Senate inquiry following their
next session with a tally of the miles they had traveled on circuit: Jus-
tice John McKinley, the Ninth Circuit Justice, logged 10,000 miles
during the session, 6500 more miles than any other Justice.66  Only
62. See Act of May 4, 1826, ch. 37, § 1, 4 Stat. 160.
63. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 44.
64. See id. at 45.
65. See Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176, 176-77.  The original Ninth Circuit con-
tained Alabama, the Eastern District of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas.  See id.
66. See SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1995, at 135 (Clare
Cushman ed., 1995) [hereinafter JUSTICES]. Depicting the power of a circuit-riding Justice to
help shape the law, McKinley’s is an interesting story: He had the largest docket of circuit
cases, and Louisiana presented a unique problem in that it produced a blend of civil- and com-
mon-law cases.  See id.  The rigors of circuit-riding contributed to the generally poor state of his
health, which limited his role in the latter half of his fifteen years on the Court.  See id.  In 1838,
while on circuit in Alabama, McKinley ruled in favor of Alabama’s power to prohibit out-of-
state banks from buying and selling bills of exchange within the state. See id. at 132-33.  It was
widely feared that this decision, in the words of the president of one of the banks involved in
the litigation, would “shake the whole foundations of intercourse between the States.”  Id. at
133.  The case was appealed to the Supreme Court.  See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 519 (1839).  This momentous decision was awaited nervously by corporations across the
nation, as an affirmation of the Ninth Circuit opinion would significantly restrict “the ability of
corporations to engage in interstate economic activity.”  See JUSTICES, supra, at 134.  The Su-
preme Court reversed in an 8-1 decision, declaring that a law of comity applied to the states.
See Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 596-97.  The lone dissent came, of course, from
McKinley, who insisted that the state’s right to regulate banking within its borders took prece-
dence over the nationalist position of the other eight Justices.  See id. at 597-602 (McKinley, J.,
dissenting).
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Chief Justice Taney traveled less than 1000 miles.67  These distances
were staggering considering the rudimentary modes of transportation
available even to the most distinguished travelers of the day.  This
graphic illustration of the grueling task of circuit-riding was met with
indifference by Congress.  Another month was added to the Supreme
Court session.68  The Justices themselves attempted to cut into their
backlog by limiting counsel debate at oral argument to two hours per
side.69  These piecemeal reforms, however, had little effect as the
Congress continued to delay action on circuit-riding, which remained
the Achilles’ heel of the judiciary.
In 1855, a tenth circuit was created for California due to the huge
amount of litigation that was arising in the newest state; law was be-
ing created almost overnight to deal with property disputes.70  Oregon
was added to the Tenth Circuit in 1864,71 and a tenth Justice was
added to the Supreme Court.72  In 1866, the Court was reduced to
seven Justices and the number of circuits to nine,73 but in 1869, the
number of Justices was raised again to nine.74
The Union’s victory in the Civil War vindicated federal notions
of national organization; change in the judicial structure came more
rapidly after the war. In addition to the triumph of the federal gov-
ernmental ideal, commercial factors provided the impetus for judicial
reform.  The railroads continued to press westward (the Union Pa-
cific railroad completed the first cross-country route in 1869), ship-
ping became more international in nature as the United States be-
came a major exporting nation, and the proliferation of inventions
created patent controversies that required the attention of the federal
67. See JUSTICES, supra note 66, at 135.
68. See Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 96, § 1, 5 Stat. 676, 676.
69. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 52.
70. See Act of Mar. 2, 1855, ch. 142, § 1, 10 Stat. 631, 631; see also FRANKFURTER &
LANDIS, supra note 1, at 54-55 (noting the explosion of litigation in California in the early
1850s and the absolute necessity for more judges to deal with the rapidly increasing caseload).
71. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. C, § 1, 12 Stat. 794.
72. See id.
73. See Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 2, 14 Stat. 209, 209 (eliminating the Tenth Circuit
and creating the nucleus for the modern Ninth Circuit: the Act placed California, Oregon, and
Nevada in the Ninth Circuit).  Montana and Washington were added to the Ninth Circuit in
1889.  See Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 21, 25 Stat. 676, 682.  Idaho was added in 1890.  See
Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, § 16, 26 Stat. 215, 217.  In 1884, certain circuit court powers were
conferred on the District Court of the Alaskan Territory; it was placed in the Ninth Circuit by
the Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 24, 26.
74. See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44.
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courts.75  The caseload of the Supreme Court multiplied sixfold be-
tween 1850 and 1880.76  This, of course, reflected huge increases in the
number of cases being brought in the district and circuit courts as
well.77  The need for an intermediate tier of courts with full appellate
jurisdiction became increasingly apparent as the federal caseload
continued to mount.
Change did not come overnight, however.  The period between
1870 and 1891 has been described as the “nadir of federal judicial
administration.”78  In 1875, Congress gave the lower federal courts
nearly the full extent of jurisdiction contained in the Constitution.
Removal jurisdiction was granted, and any suit asserting a right un-
der the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States could
now be brought in federal district court, even without diversity of the
parties, subject to amount-in-controversy requirements.79
75. For a description of this period, see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 56-65.
76. See id. at 60.  Some of the increase in the Supreme Court docket stemmed from the
creation of the Court of Claims in 1855.  See id. at 63.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(16 Wall.) (1873), also created a steady stream of litigation for the Court.  The cases signaled
the rise of substantive Due Process review and an increase in Fourteenth Amendment claims
that reached the Court:
[I]t would seem, from the character of many of the cases before us . . . that the clause
under consideration is looked upon as the means of bringing to the test of the deci-
sion of this court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a State court
of the justice of the decision against him, and of the merits of the legislation on which
such a decision may be founded.
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
77. The number of cases in the district and circuit courts rose from 29,013 in 1873 to 54,194
in 1890.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 45.  Many circuits were unable to keep
pace with their workloads; several became exclusively one-judge courts as judges were not able
to attend at the same time because of their burgeoning district caseloads.  See FRANKFURTER
& LANDIS, supra note 1, at 77-78 n.95.  By the 1880s, 88% of circuit work was left to single
(mostly district) judges, whose word, in effect, became final in a great number of the cases be-
fore them.  See id. at 87.  Often, district judges on circuit duty would be called upon to be the
sole arbiter of an appeal from one of their own decisions: “Such an appeal is not from Philip
drunk to Philip sober, but from Philip sober to Philip [drunk] with the vanity of a matured
opinion and doubtless also a published decision.”  Walter B. Hill, The Federal Judicial System,
REP. 12TH ANN. MEETING A.B.A. 289, 307 (1889).  With $5000 amount-in-controversy re-
quirements for appeals in both the district and circuit courts, conscious efforts to keep the
amount below this statutorily mandated minimum (including disclaiming all amounts awarded
above that sum) ensured that the district court decision would be final.  See FRANKFURTER &
LANDIS, supra note 1, at 88 n.144.
78. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 45.
79. See Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470.  For a discussion of this
act see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 45.  It is interesting to note that legal scholarship
at the time did not seem concerned that the increase in federal jurisdiction would outstrip the
system’s ability to handle the resultant caseload.  See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1,
at 65 & n.34.
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The system, of course, was not equipped to handle the resultant
influx of litigation, and Congress seemed hopelessly divided as to a
solution.80  Proposals for additional judgeships for the inferior federal
courts came to a standstill during Andrew Johnson’s administration
because the Republican Congress was afraid to create seats that
would be filled by Johnson, a Democrat.81  One of the proposals from
this period reflected Congress’ preoccupation with retention of the
circuit system: Senator Williams of Oregon proposed a Supreme
Court comprising eighteen Justices, nine of whom would stay in
Washington and nine of whom would ride circuit, with three shifting
each year.  He claimed that this plan would keep the Court in touch
with the circuits and prevent it from becoming “fossilized.”82  Al-
though this notion, and others like it, was roundly criticized, due in
part to the fact that it would have allowed one President to appoint
nine new Justices,83 it does mark the beginning of a slow process of
acknowledgment by Congress that the Supreme Court was overbur-
dened to a degree that could not be corrected by piecemeal legisla-
tion.  After President Johnson left office, the gridlock that had made
unthinkable the consensus necessary for creation of an intermediate
appellate tribunal began to dissipate and the path toward the Evarts
Act began to clear.
The first steps were halting.  The Act of April 10, 1869,84 reduced
mandatory circuit-riding to once every two years.85  The broadening
of the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction under the aforementioned
Act of March 3, 1875,86 and the ensuing onslaught of litigation, how-
ever, rendered the 1869 Act impotent.87  The Supreme Court docket
rose to an unprecedented and unmanageable 1800 cases in 1890;88 in
December of 1889, responding to nationwide pleas from bench and
bar alike, including public entreaties by Justices of the Court, Presi-
dent Harrison (a former lawyer) encouraged Congress to create an
80. See HART & WESCHSLER, supra note 35, at 45.
81. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 72.  Congress was suspicious that the
Supreme Court would impede implementation of its Reconstruction agenda.  See id. at 73.  This
tension with the Supreme Court made Congress less amenable to the notion of passing legisla-
tion to ease the Court’s burdens.  See id. at 72.
82. Id. at 75.
83. See id. at 72.
84. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
85. See id. § 4, 16 Stat. 45.
86. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
87. See id. § 2, 18 Stat. 470-71.
88. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 86.
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intermediate federal court of appeals.89  Having received the com-
mand from the chief executive to take all steps necessary to address
the long-unresolved problems of the judiciary, Congress finally re-
sponded with decisive action.  The final round of vociferous debate
and compromise came to pass: The House reported out a bill in 1890,
which combined the circuit and district courts and created nine courts
of appeals with jurisdiction over cases arising from diversity of citi-
zenship, subject to certification.90  The bill abolished circuit-riding,
adding two additional judges to each circuit.91
The proposed legislation met with considerable resistance in the
Senate.92  Even in the aftermath of President Harrison’s admonition,
anti-reform sentiment retained considerable force in the upper
chamber.93  The familiar opposition arguments were trotted out with
vigor: fears were expressed that a regional intermediate appellate
layer would create inconsistency in the interpretation of the law.94
There were also those who clung fiercely to the notion that the Jus-
tices should still ride circuit to keep in touch with the nation as a
whole.95
The need arose for a man with the strength, foresight, and nego-
tiating skill to shepherd this momentous bill through the Senate in a
form that enabled it to retain its teeth.  The task fell upon Senator
William M. Evarts of New York.  In 1882, he had led the fight before
the American Bar Association (ABA) against an earlier attempt to
create an intermediate layer of appellate courts.96  He had supported
an alternative proposal to divide the Supreme Court into three pan-
els, which would hear cases involving common law, equity, and admi-
ralty/revenue respectively.97  Few would have guessed at this juncture
that Evarts’s name would be forever associated with the compromise
that created the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals nine years
later.
89. See id. at 97.
90. See H.R. 9014, 51st Cong. (1st Sess.) §§ 1, 9 (1890).
91. See id. § 2.
92. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 98.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 100.
96. See id. at 98.
97. See id. at 83, 98.  According to this plan, introduced by Senator Manning of Mississippi,
the Court would sit en banc to hear cases construing the Constitution and treaties.  See id. at 83.
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In the years between 1882 and 1891, Evarts had been elected to
the Senate and had risen to a powerful position on the Senate Judici-
ary Committee.98  He had also abandoned the three-division plan for
the Supreme Court and embraced the theory of an intermediate ap-
pellate tier.99  His position on the Committee made him a likely can-
didate to push the legislation through; he was, however, a tradition-
alist who favored retention of the old circuit courts.100  Indeed, the
retention of some vestiges of the 1789 system (although the old cir-
cuit courts quickly became virtually powerless) probably helped to
sell the new legislation to some of the conservative senators who had
blocked change for so many years.  An Attorney General under
Johnson and Secretary of State under Hayes, Evarts possessed both
the legal expertise to perceive the dire need for change and the
statesmanlike qualities to push the law through the Senate.101
When the bill from the House reached the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Evarts led the revision process, transforming it into a bill
that could pass muster in the Senate.102  After studying the laws and
cases that had shaped the jurisdiction of the federal courts, he drafted
an outline of his version of the bill.103  He requested comments from
the Justices of the Supreme Court and several circuit court judges.104
Evarts, who was going blind, then dictated what was to become
known as the Evarts Act to his secretary in one sitting. The bill pro-
vided for nine intermediate federal courts of appeals of three judges
each, which would hear appeals of virtually all types of cases from the
district and circuit courts.105  Although some appeals, most notably
98. See id. at 98.
99. See id.  Initially, Evarts had “fear[ed] that an intermediate court might delay appeals
and that two courts with power to render final decisions might be dangerous and of doubtful
constitutionality.”  CHESTER L. BARROWS, WILLIAM M. EVARTS: LAWYER, DIPLOMAT,
STATESMAN 480 (1941).  However, by 1889, nothing had been done to solve the problem of the
arrears of the Supreme Court docket, which at this point was so large that it would have taken
the Court four years to clear it, even if no new cases were filed.  See id.  Evarts, sensing that the
three-division plan which he had supported before the ABA in 1882 would not garner wide-
spread Congressional backing, adopted the more widely palatable intermediate-layer approach,
a move which subjected him to some accusations of hypocrisy.  See id. at 480-82.  Rather than
hypocrisy, Evarts’s move was a maneuver by a skilled diplomat who saw a way to implement
important change and who did not let his own biases block the path to positive reform.
100. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 98-99.
101. See BARROWS, supra note 99, at 164, 311, 480-81.
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those posing questions of constitutionality, would go directly to the
Supreme Court, appeals from cases involving diversity of citizenship
would go to the new United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, a re-
form that eased the burden on the Supreme Court immensely.106  The
bill passed the Senate by a vote of 44-6 and was signed into law on
March 2, 1891, two days before Evarts left the Senate.107  Thus, in his
last days as a Senator, the ailing Evarts managed to end 102 years of
Congressional inertia.  The Act retained enough of the traditional ju-
dicial structure to ensure passage, while the Supreme Court got the
docket relief it needed: New appellate filings in the Supreme Court
fell forty-three percent between 1887 and 1892.108
Congress addressed a loophole in the Evarts Act with the pas-
sage of the Criminal Appeals Act in 1907.109  The Criminal Appeals
Act resulted from a protracted struggle between President Theodore
Roosevelt and Congress over social reform legislation, centering
upon Roosevelt’s supposed distaste for “Big Business.”110  The Act
enabled appeals to be made directly to the Supreme Court in criminal
cases in which the constitutionality of a provision of federal law was
in question.111  This legislation arose from concern over the power of
single federal district judges (many districts still had only one judge)
to construe the meaning of federal laws and pass upon their constitu-
tionality without Supreme Court review (the Court still did not have
jurisdiction over such cases).112
106. See id.  Evarts also pushed for the extension of Supreme Court jurisdiction to cover
appeals from all cases involving “infamous” crimes.  See id. at 482.  Evarts took the meaning of
“infamous crimes” in its constitutional sense, which is closer to the realm of “serious crimes,”
such as crimes of a capital nature.  See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 110.  He was
apparently unaware that the Supreme Court had broadened the scope of crimes that could fall
into the “infamous” category.  See id.  Thus, Evarts’s mistake “had the unfortunate result of
adding greatly to the number of cases that would otherwise be shunted to the new courts.”
BARROWS, supra note 99, at 482.  Indeed, the mistake brought to the Court all criminal cases in
which “the accused might be sentenced to imprisonment in a penitentiary, even if the punish-
ment actually imposed is a fine only.”  FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 110 n.42
(quoting Letter from Chief Justice Fuller to Senator George F. Hoar). This problem was reme-
died by the Act of Jan. 15, 1897, ch. 29, 29 Stat. 487, which eliminated the reference to
“otherwise infamous crimes.”  Id. § 2, 29 Stat. at 487.
107. See BARROWS, supra note 99, at 482; see also Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
108. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 110.
109. See Criminal Appeals Act, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907).
110. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 115-19.
111. See Criminal Appeals Act, 34 Stat. at 1246.
112. In particular, the law stemmed from the uproar caused by Judge Humphrey of the
Northern District of Illinois, who, in a case involving the government’s pursuit of the so-called
“Beef Trust,” employed his own interpretation of Section 6 of the Act of Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552,
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While the traditionalist in Senator Evarts had insisted upon the
retention of the old circuit courts in order for the Evarts Act to pass,
it was clear that the usefulness of these courts had passed; their most
important function, as courts of appeals for the district courts, was
usurped by the new intermediate courts.  The continuing existence of
these lower circuit courts served more to create confusion than any-
thing else; the distinction between their original jurisdiction and that
of the district courts had never been clear.113  Even after the Act of
April 10, 1869 created additional circuit judgeships,114 the circuit
judges were unable to reach all of their districts for a long enough
time to clear their dockets.115  In 1899, realizing that the lower circuit
courts needed to be eliminated but that enough traditionalists still sat
in Congress to quash any poorly drafted bills to that effect,116 Senator
George Hoar shrewdly referred the matter to the Commission on the
Revision of the Laws, which had been set up by Congress to revise
and codify the nation’s penal laws.117  In 1901, the Commission’s
mandate was enlarged to encompass the revision and codification of
all of the permanent laws of the United States.118
The commission produced the Judicial Code of the United
States, which abolished circuit courts and replaced them with district
courts.119  This, of course, elicited one final firestorm of protest from
32 Stat. 825 (creating the Department of Commerce and Labor), in a manner unappealing to
Congress.  See United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808, 816-27 (1906).  Senator Patterson of
Colorado went so far as to attribute Congress’s action solely to Judge Humphrey’s decision.
See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 116 n.64.
113. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 129.
114. See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44.
115. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 128-29.  The absurdity of maintaining
the two court systems is brought home by the following description of a typical day in the
Wyoming circuit court in 1896:
The indictment had been returned into the District Court, and by formal order trans-
ferred to the Circuit Court, and the case was tried there.  Several other cases were
tried, for crimes other than murder, some of them being of Federal jurisdiction, be-
cause committed on the same Indian reservation.  These were tried in the District
Court.  Time and time again would the presiding judge have Court opened as a Cir-
cuit Court, and after the calling of the docket, have that Court closed with due so-
lemnity.  Immediately afterwards the crier would announce that the District Court
was in session.  There would be a switching of dockets, and the District Court would
proceed to business.
Rarely would a circuit judge preside at a Circuit Court.
Breckons, supra note 53, at 457.
116. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
117. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 130.
118. See id. at 132.
119. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
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old-school politicians like Senator Elihu Root and leading lawyers
like Joseph Choate, whose aversion to sweeping change caused them
to cling to the traditional appellate structure.  The protest was to no
avail.120  The Act of March 3, 1911, abolished the circuit courts.121  One
hundred twenty-two years after the first Judiciary Act, the federal
courts were restructured into a form which has basically remained in-
tact to this day. There have been some changes, most notably the
creation of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,122 the
carving of the Tenth Circuit out of the Eighth in 1929,123 the removal
of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama from the Fifth Circuit to create the
Eleventh Circuit in 1981,124 and the creation of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in 1982.125  The Act of February 13, 1925,
ended the right of a second appeal from the Courts of Appeals to the
Supreme Court, which theretofore had been granted in certain types
of cases.126  The Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Justices and the
Circuit Judicial Conferences, as well as the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, created in 1939 as a central office for rec-
ord-keeping, represent efforts to improve the administrative opera-
tions of the federal courts.127  Alaska and Hawaii were added to the
Ninth Circuit upon attaining statehood in 1959.128  While there have
been other changes in the federal judiciary since the Evarts Act, the
basic structure enacted therein has had remarkable staying power,
which is indicative both of the keen foresight exhibited by the Con-
gressmen who worked on the Act, and the equally amazing resistance
to change in the judiciary throughout Congressional history.
120. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 133-34.
121. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 289, 36 Stat. at 1167.
122. See Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, § 1, 27 Stat. 434, 434-35.
123. See Tenth Judicial Circuit Act, ch. 363, § 1, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (1929).
124. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2,
94 Stat. 1994, 1994.
125. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25,
25.
126. The Evarts Act allowed a mandatory second appeal in civil cases where the amount in
controversy was over $1000, except in diversity and certain other cases.  See Evarts Act, ch.
517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891).  The Act of February 13, 1925 removed this right by limiting
Supreme Court mandatory review to Court of Appeals decisions that invalidated state statutes
on Constitutional or federal grounds.  See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 936, 939.
127. For an overview of the administrative development of the federal judicial system, see
FISH, supra note 41, at 431.
128. See Act of Mar. 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 13, 73 Stat. 4, 10 (Hawaii); Act of June 25,
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-70, § 23(a), 73 Stat. 141, 147 (Alaska).
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II.  THE PROBLEM
“Everyone who studies the issue understands that sooner or later
that [sic] the size of the ninth circuit will have to be dealt with.”129
Typically, law review articles on the problems currently facing
the federal judiciary treat the history of the system in a few short
paragraphs, then move on to the problems of today.  The preceding
discourse on the history of this nation’s judicial system is intended to
give a fuller sense of how the judiciary has adapted (or not adapted)
to changes in the country in general and the job of the courts in par-
ticular.  The problems that have historically confronted the federal
appellate tribunals have come in different forms, but underneath
these trappings they have remained virtually the same: skyrocketing
case filings, geographical size, and concern for consistent application
of the law have been the concerns which have mobilized the some-
times obstinate Congress to effect change.  These problems face the
courts of appeals, particularly the Ninth Circuit, today.
The new Commission proposed by the House of Representatives
would be charged with the task of evaluating methods to alleviate the
Ninth Circuit’s crushing caseload.  If finally approved, the Commis-
sion must shake loose from the historical inertia that has bogged
down its predecessors and recommend substantive change.  The fol-
lowing sections demonstrate that the best way to accomplish the
long-overdue reform of the largest circuit is to divide California be-
tween a reconfigured Ninth and a new Twelfth Circuit, and that the
Senate’s most recent proposal is among the worst plans for reform.
A. Caseload
The principal problem facing the Ninth Circuit today is its over-
whelming caseload.  This overload creates a backlog in the court’s
docket and a delay in processing appeals, resulting in a dilution of
justice for parties that bring appeals in the circuit.130  Some observers
argue that there is no “crisis of volume” in the Ninth or any other cir-
cuit.131  Indeed, some (including Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr.) point
129. 142 CONG. REC. S2229 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
130. See Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 32 (stating that the federal appellate courts’ backlog impairs
their ability to perform their lawmaking and error correction functions adequately).
131. See Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the “Crisis of
Volume” in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97, 101-02 (1994).  But see
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to the relatively quick disposition of cases by the Ninth Circuit’s
judges once the cases reach the three-judge panel as evidence that
delay is not a problem.132  This argument is unpersuasive in relation to
the larger point at issue: While cases are disposed relatively quickly
once they reach a panel, it takes far too long for these cases to reach
that stage of the appellate process.
Two of the most significant reforms of the Ninth Circuit passed
by Congress are the division of the court into three administrative
units and the authorization of a “mini en banc” procedure, which al-
lows en banc panels to comprise fewer than the full complement of
judges in the circuit.133  The effects of these reforms upon the per-
ceived problems that face the Ninth Circuit are a source of lively de-
bate among scholars, politicians, and practitioners.  Even with the
administrative units, the use of three-judge panels (as in other cir-
cuits), and the introduction of the mini en banc hearing, the median
time for resolution of an appeal in the Ninth Circuit is approximately
fourteen months, the longest in the nation.134  Half of all appeals to
the Ninth Circuit take more than two years.135 The majority of the
time is consumed by court reporters and attorneys in record prepara-
tion and briefing; only 2.5 months of this time for orally-argued cases
and .9 months for submitted cases are spent in judges’ chambers.136
These statistics suggest that the circuit’s problems of delay are di-
rectly related to the inordinate number of cases that the court’s infra-
structure must process.
There are numerous problems inherent in the long delays be-
tween the filing of an appeal and the oral argument stage.  Delay may
result in deterioration of evidence, which may affect the quality of
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 109 (1990) (noting the “crisis in volume” in
the courts of appeals).
132. See Procter Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 57 MONT. L. REV. 291,
297 (1996); cf. 142 CONG. REC. S2230 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(arguing that the Ninth Circuit disposes of cases quickly only because it issues relatively few
opinions).
133. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (“Any court of
appeals having more than 15 active judges . . . may perform its en banc function by such num-
ber of members of its en banc courts as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals.”).
Each court of appeals has its own set of procedural rules.
134. See Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries—Why the Proposal to Divide
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 917, 936 (1990).
135. See id. at 937.
136. See id. at 936-37.
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decisions where retrials are ordered.137  Pressures of time may affect
judges’ decisionmaking. Circuit judges may give greater deference to
the trial judge in the interest of speedier disposition.138  Delay may
also affect the circuit’s ability to set ground-breaking precedent, since
cases involving novel issues of law will be decided in other circuits
while their counterparts remain mired in the Ninth Circuit system.
Delay may also affect the lawmaking function of appellate
judges:
The law-making role requires a delicate balance between the im-
portance of flexibility in the national law and the importance of sta-
bility of doctrine.  Busy judges will find it difficult to evaluate these
needs in the cases that come before them, and they may be more
tempted to take the shortcuts which can be made by ignoring one of
the interests. . . . Appellate judges are expected to deliberate and
then to arrive at a collegial decision based on the matured thought
of each judge participating.  Finally, the decision is expected to be
explained in terms that will withstand public inspection.  These
techniques for controlling the personal factor require a considerable
investment of time and intellectual energy; as congestion makes
these commodities scarce, we must expect that judgments will be-
come more impulsive, less reflective and less impersonal.139
With Congress considering the addition of ten new judges, such
concerns about the dilution of justice in the Ninth Circuit become
even more pertinent.  The long delays between the filing of notice of
appeal to the final disposition suggest that the Ninth Circuit’s prob-
lems are administrative in nature: There are simply too many appeals
filed for the court to handle them effectively.  The Ninth Circuit, as is
trumpeted far and wide by opponents of circuit-splitting, has been the
vanguard circuit for administrative reform.  The Ninth Circuit was
the first to divide itself into administrative units, it was the first to
employ the mini en banc, and it has implemented a computerized
case-tracking system and electronic networks in an effort to facilitate
close communication and foster what collegiality can be maintained
among the twenty-eight judges.140 Despite these impressive efforts,
the total time of disposition in the “vanguard” administrative circuit
137. See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 554 (1969) [hereinafter Car-
rington, Crowded Dockets].
138. See id.
139. Id. at 554-55.
140. See Hug, supra note 132, at 298-301.
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remains almost four months longer than the national average of ten
and one-half months and is the second worst among the circuits.141
B. Unpublished Opinions
One reason the Ninth Circuit is able to boast of its quick disposi-
tion of appeals once they reach a panel is that 78.9% of the circuit’s
opinions are unpublished.142  While unpublished opinions are cer-
tainly not unique to the Ninth Circuit, this statistic still raises some
legitimate concerns. The initial decision as to whether or not an
opinion will be published often rests with a staff attorney, who em-
ploys a screening procedure that identifies certain types of cases
(social security cases, Federal Tort Claims cases, pro se prisoner ap-
peals, to name a few) as likely candidates for unpublished opinions.143
In theory, a judge will later review this decision.144  In practice, in a
circuit as big as the Ninth, many of these decisions may go essentially
unreviewed, as judges are too pressed for time to be able to give such
decisions more than a cursory review.145
Much is made in the literature of how unpublished opinions cre-
ate some sort of secret body of law and lead inevitably to incoherent
intracircuit application of the law.146  Such arguments may be over-
stated in an age in which unpublished opinions can be found online.
However, despite the fact that the circuit has a subscription service
for its unpublished opinions, the proliferation of these opinions does
create some concerns for the circuit that can be traced to the sheer
amount of work with which the judges are presented.  First, while
non-publication rules are designed to leave only routine cases un-
published, an overworked administrative system can often leave deci-
sions of whether or not to publish in the hands of non-Article III per-
sonnel.147  This can affect the development of precedent, because
141. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 12, at 107 (1995).  The Eleventh Circuit, at a little
over fifteen months, is the worst.  See id.
142. See id. at 50.
143. See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and
Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV.  940, 953 (1989)
(observing that “[d]ecisions that result in nonpublication have been made in gross rather than
individually, at least on the initial level, and judges have few incentives to examine these initial
decisions closely.”).
144. See id. at 953.
145. See id. at 953-54 n.69.
146. See  id.  passim (discussing drawbacks of circuits’ treatment of unpublished opinions).
147. See id. at 953-54.
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unpublished opinions are sometimes only binding in narrowly-
defined areas.148  Such a situation creates an imperfect body of pub-
lished law that inevitably fails to fully reflect the opinions of the
judges.149  Second, the people whose appeals fall into categories of
cases that routinely go unpublished are often precisely those who
cannot afford online or subscription service and whose attorneys
cannot afford the expense or time required to ferret out judicial pat-
terns in unpublished opinions.
The prevalence of unpublished opinions can prevent litigants
from effectively gauging how an appeal might be handled, especially
in one of the areas targeted for unpublished opinions.150  While un-
published decisions are meant to represent applications of settled
law, leaving the costly publication process to opinions that make law,
modify existing law, or are noteworthy for some other reason, this in-
tention is not always borne out in practice.151  An illustration of the
possible confusion that can result from limited publication of Ninth
Circuit opinions is found in a study done by Professor Robel of the
court’s immigration decisions for the period between October 1986
and September 1987.152  In the court’s published immigration opin-
ions, one concurrence and one dissent appear.153  In the unpublished
opinions, however, there are seven concurrences and seven dissents,
reflecting wide disagreement among members of the court as to what
ought to be required of the state’s immigration agency and what its
procedures should be.154  This 7:1 ratio of unpublished to published
148. See 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (providing that unpublished dispositions do not have precedential
value and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of res judicata, collat-
eral estoppel, or the particular law of the case).
149. Even judges sometimes have difficulty finding published precedent.  Judge Richard
Posner has written that “[d]espite the vast number of published opinions, most federal circuit
judges will confess that a surprising fraction of federal appeals are difficult to decide, not be-
cause there are too many precedents but because there are too few on point.”  RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 123 (1985).
150. See Robel, supra note 143, at 947.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 948.
153. See id.  Of the Ninth Circuit’s 88 immigration decisions on the merits in 1987, only 22
were published.  See id.
154. See id. at 948-49:
Taken together, the large number of reversals and separate expressions in un-
published opinions reveals a good bit of dissatisfaction on the [court’s part] with a
wide variety of agency practices, as well as a fair amount of disagreement among
members of the court about what it ought to require of the [immigration] agency.  It
would be difficult to discern this pattern, however, if one were limited to the court’s
expressions.
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opinions illustrates the difficulty that a potential appellant would ex-
perience while attempting to gauge the court’s views on immigration
procedure.
Reducing the judges’ caseload would help immensely to solve
these problems by facilitating more judicial supervision of publica-
tion decisions and leaving more time for deliberation in cases which
might otherwise go unpublished.155  An additional benefit might be an
increase of published decisions in specialized areas in which the vast
majority of opinions currently go unpublished.
C.  The Mini En Banc
An additional difficulty caused by the size of the Ninth Circuit is
that the large number of judges has rendered the en banc hearing156
extinct:  There have been no full en banc hearings of the twenty-eight
judges.157  Instead, the mini en banc has become the norm, with
Id. at 949.
155. The Federal Courts Study Committee found that 63% of judges responding to its sur-
vey “rely on their clerks to do at least some work they believe they should do themselves, and
30% do so ‘often’ or ‘usually.’”  1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 72 (1990).  Of the federal appellate judges who responded, 39% said
that they often, sometimes, or usually rely on staff attorneys to do work they believe they
should do themselves.  See id. at 74.
156. The en banc procedure developed as a response to the inevitable “instances when the
law of the circuit fails to take shape in the ordinary course of panel decisions.”  Carrington,
Crowded Dockets, supra note 137, at 580-81.  In Lang’s Estate v. Commissioner, the Ninth Cir-
cuit certified an intracircuit disagreement to the United States Supreme Court because it
doubted that an en banc hearing would be legal due to a long-standing requirement (stemming
from the original circuit courts, which comprised three judges), seemingly codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 212, which, at the time, ordered appellate court panels to be composed of three judges.  See
97 F.2d 867, 869, 870 n.2 (1938).  The Supreme Court resolved the conflict without passing on
the legality of the en banc.  See Lang’s Estate v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938). In Textile
Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, the Court approved an en banc decision of the Third
Circuit and placed the onus of maintaining intracircuit stability upon the circuit courts of ap-
peals themselves.   See 314 U.S. 326, 333-35 (1941).  In Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. West-
ern Pacific Railroad Co., the Supreme Court issued a ruling requiring all federal courts of ap-
peals to formulate en banc procedures and to draft rules enabling litigants to request en banc
rehearings.   See 345 U.S. 247, 267-68 (1953).  The Court was careful to require rules enabling
litigants to request, not compel, the courts of appeals to rehear cases en banc; the ultimate deci-
sion to sit en banc rested with the courts, to be made as they saw fit.  See Western Pac. R.R.
Corp., 345 U.S. at 257-58.
157. There have been only three attempts to assemble a full en banc panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit since the Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-485, 92 Stat. 1629, made the mini en banc
possible.  See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 85 F.3d
1440 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997); Campbell v. Wood, 20 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994); United
States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980).
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eleven-judge panels consisting of the Chief Judge and ten circuit
judges chosen by lot.158  In 1978 when Congress approved the expan-
sion of the Ninth Circuit from thirteen to twenty-three justices, it also
authorized any court of appeals with more than fifteen active justices
to “perform its en banc function by such number of members . . . as
may be prescribed by rule of the court.”159  The Ninth Circuit is the
only circuit which employs the mini en banc.  Any Ninth Circuit
judge may initiate a vote on whether or not the court should hear a
case en banc (at this stage, en banc refers solely to the 11-judge mini
en banc); such hearings are rare.160  Technically, a mini en banc deci-
sion may be reheard by all twenty-eight judges (once again, a major-
ity vote of the court is required), but such a full hearing has not been
granted since the mini en banc was authorized in 1978.161  Thus, al-
though an option exists for the full court to rehear a case, in practice,
as few as six of twenty-eight judges can speak for the full court (and,
thus, potentially affect the lives of the forty-five million people living
within the circuit’s boundaries) in hearings supposedly designed to
resolve intracircuit disagreements.162
As Senator Conrad Burns, a chief proponent of the most recent
legislative effort to split the Ninth Circuit, characterized the mini en
banc’s inherent luck-of-the-draw approach to the development of cir-
cuit law: “[T]he purpose of the en banc court is to establish the law of
the circuit by a majority of all the judges, not by a simple majority of
a subset of judges randomly chosen, whose decision may not be rep-
resentative.”163  Such a situation seems unfair to parties who may wish
to request a rehearing en banc: Their request for a rehearing of a de-
cision rendered by three judges chosen at random to speak for
twenty-eight will, if granted, be heard by another randomly-chosen
panel of less than half of the sitting judges.  Although a true expres-
sion of the will of the full court (a full en banc) is possible, such a
hearing has never been granted and even the staunchest advocates of
the Ninth Circuit’s en banc system admit that assembling a full re-
158. See Burns, supra note 9, at 252.
159. The Act of Oct. 20, 1978, § 6, 92 Stat. at 1633.
160. See Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of
Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 548-49 (1989) [hereinafter
Hellman, Jumboism].
161. See Compassion in Dying, 85 F.3d at 1441 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
162. See Burns, supra note 9, at 252.
163. Id. at 260 n.30.
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hearing would be an incredibly lengthy administrative undertaking, 164
and, presumably, quite a costly financial endeavor as well.
It is commonly argued that the en banc situation in the Ninth
Circuit is not an important enough concern to constitute an argument
in favor of circuit division because the full en banc mechanism is sel-
dom invoked.165  This contention fails to acknowledge the importance
of the en banc mechanism for maintaining intracircuit consistency.
That a form of review is seldom granted does not logically diminish
either its importance or the need for fairness in its application: The
United States Supreme Court annually grants certiorari to less than
one percent of cases brought to its attention,166 but few would ex-
trapolate from this that the certiorari process is a trifling concern.
The fact that the Supreme Court has sanctioned the full en banc as
the method for resolving intracircuit disputes attests to its continuing
vitality.
The Ninth Circuit’s size is likely the ultimate reason why the full
en banc (and, indeed the mini en banc) is invoked so rarely.  As Pro-
fessor Carrington pointed out as early as 1969, even in a moderately
sized circuit, “[t]he en banc procedure is . . . time-consuming for the
judiciary.”167  One argument that can be advanced in favor of the
Ninth Circuit’s current size is that all twenty-eight judges participate
in the decision to hold a mini en banc hearing. Thus, in theory, the
entire court has input as to whether or not a case is reheard, even if
only eleven of the judges actually participate in the rehearing.  This
process, however, involves exchanges of memoranda and lengthy
consultations that disrupt the judges’ already packed schedules. The
fact that this time-consuming process can result in a mini en banc,
which is even more disruptive (and expensive) could militate, even
164. See Hellman, Jumboism, supra note 160, at 546.
165. See id. at 548-49 (noting that Ninth Circuit judges called for a vote on en banc rehear-
ing in fewer than 160 of the more than 12,000 cases heard between 1981 through 1986); see also
Office of the Circuit Executive for the U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Position Paper in Op-
position to S. 956-Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995 (1995), reprinted
in 141 CONG. REC. S10,436-02, S10,437 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (noting that Ninth Circuit
judges hold mini en banc hearings less than twelve times a year).
166. See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Then and Now: Danger in the Courts, 44 FED. LAW., Jan.
1997, at 41, 42.  The Long Range Planning Office of the Administrative Office of United States
Courts estimates that by the year 2020, the United States Supreme Court will hear one-tenth of
one percent of circuit court appeals.  See Charles W. Nihan & Harvey Rishikof, Rethinking the
Federal Court System: Thinking the Unthinkable, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 349, 351 (1994).
167. Carrington, Crowded Dockets, supra note 137, at 582.  Another significant problem
inherent in coordinating an en banc hearing or rehearing is the arrangement of oral arguments,
which necessarily falls outside the regular schedule.  See id.
GRIBBIN1 06/04/98  1:33 PM
380 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:351
subconsciously, against the initiation of the en banc process.  Profes-
sor Carrington presciently posited such a situation twenty-eight years
ago:
As long as the three-judge panel making decisions is not too
small a segment of the whole court, this [en banc] means of keeping
the panels in step with one another is probably effective enough to
make its inefficiencies worth bearing.  As the court is enlarged to
meet the burgeoning caseload, however, there is a serious threat that
the enterprise of maintaining the law of the circuit will gradually
collapse because of the inherent weakness of its operation.  At some
point, en banc procedure becomes entirely unmanageable.  Twenty
judges cannot . . . effectively deliberate. As the number of judges . . .
is increased, en banc procedure becomes not only less effective, but
more costly and more dilatory and therefore less likely to be in-
voked.  Thus it becomes less useful as an implicit restraint on the in-
dividual panels.  Indeed, as the size of the court is increased, the
likelihood of differences among the judges is increased, and a wider
variety of idiosyncrasies is likely to appear in their decisions.168
The most recent of the three attempts to convene a full en banc
rehearing of a Ninth Circuit decision is a telling example of the
problems that result when a circuit becomes too big to effectively po-
lice its own laws.  In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,169 the Ninth
Circuit voted not to rehear in full the 8-3 decision of a mini en banc
panel to strike down Washington’s law against assisted suicide on
constitutional grounds.170  Judges O’Scannlain, Kleinfeld, and Trott
submitted a blistering dissent decrying the plight of a circuit that can-
not be roused to full rehearing by one of the most fiercely debated
and stirring questions of our era.171  Judge O’Scannlain, in his portion
of the dissent, posits several possible reasons for the denial of re-
hearing, among them being the ominous specter of “up to twenty-
eight judges looming from three tiers of benches, intimidating the
hapless appellate advocates.”172  Although the Ninth Circuit declined
to review its decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.173  With
168. Carrington, Crowded Dockets, supra note 137, at 584.
169. 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (holding that assisted suicide is not a fundamental right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
170. See id. at 1440.
171. See id. at 1442 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
173. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1997).
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the Supreme Court’s low rate of certiorari grants, most litigants
spurned by the Ninth Circuit’s defective en banc mechanism will not
be so fortunate.  A division of the Ninth Circuit would more evenly
apportion the caseload among the new circuit judges, as well as the
number of judges who must be assembled for an en banc hearing,
thus lessening the strain on the en banc mechanism and making full
rehearings more feasible.
D. Collegiality
The unwieldy size of the Ninth Circuit is perhaps the most cited
reason for the Circuit’s difficulties.  With twenty-eight judges and
3276 possible panel combinations,174 true collegiality among the
judges becomes virtually impossible.  Judge O’Scannlain summarized
the importance of collegiality in a recent article:
Collegiality, in the appellate court context, means much more than
mere mutual respect among judges.  It defines an environment
where judges have the opportunity to sit frequently on panels to-
gether, thus increasing understanding of each other’s reasoning, de-
creasing the possibility of misunderstandings, and increasing the
tendency toward rendering unanimous decisions.  It is a precious
value which is forged from close, regular and frequent contact in
joint decisionmaking, and it is the glue which binds the judges in a
shared commitment to maintaining the institutional integrity of cir-
cuit law.  As the court of appeals continues to grow, it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to maintain the collegiality necessary for the
court to do its job.175
With ten new judgeships on the horizon, the close contact of
which Judge O’Scannlain speaks will become even less likely: The
number of possible panel permutations will grow to 8436.176  Division
of the circuit might sever some relationships which have developed
over time in spite of the court’s size, but, as former Chief Judge Tjo-
flat of the Eleventh Circuit has said, smaller circuits foster quicker
development of collegiality among fewer judges, which usually leads
to increased productivity.177
174. See Tjoflat, supra note 31, at 72.
175. O’Scannlain, supra note 14, at 315.
176. See id.
177. See Tjoflat, supra note 31, at 70.
GRIBBIN1 06/04/98  1:33 PM
382 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:351
A good illustration of the improvements in caseload disposition
that could result from a Ninth Circuit division is found in the records
of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits following the Fifth Circuit split.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have a total of twenty-nine author-
ized judgeships.178  In recent years, the two circuits combined have
disposed of 50 percent more cases than the twenty-eight judges of the
Ninth Circuit have resolved.179  The fewer judges sitting on a court,
the more likely it is for one judge to sit with any other given judge on
a panel of three.180  While collegiality is not the sole issue upon which
a decision to divide an appellate court should turn, it is a vital factor
for consideration in the development of coherent law within a circuit.
A byproduct of the lack of collegiality among judges is a lack of
predictability: Not only do litigants face a “crapshoot” as to which
panel they will get, there is also little chance of being able to predict
with any degree of accuracy what the judges might decide once em-
panelled.181  While litigants certainly are not guaranteed absolute
predictability in our adversary system, some idea of how a panel
might rule is helpful when the huge cost of an appeal in federal court
is taken into account.182  Division of the circuit would help to alleviate
this unpredictability by fostering collegiality and increasing the like-
lihood that judges will sit together more often.
E.  California
As the previous sections demonstrate, the principal problem
facing the Ninth Circuit is its caseload. The principal cause of the
caseload crisis is, simply put, California.  The state of California alone
178. See Burns, supra note 9, at 251.
179. See id.
180. See Tjoflat, supra note 31, at 70-71.
181. See 142 CONG. REC. S2230 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kyl).  As
Daniel Meador told the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference in 1988: “[A] reasonable lawyer
looking at the court could convince himself that, with a lucky draw in the panel selection, he
had at least a chance to win almost any appeal.”  Carrington,  Relationships in the Future, supra
note 4, at 73.
182. The Ninth Circuit discloses the names of panel judges on the Monday of the week pre-
ceding oral argument to “permit[ ] the parties to prepare for oral argument before particular
judges.  Once the calendar is made public, motions for continuances will rarely be granted.”
9TH CIR. R., Introduction, Court Structures and Procedures § E(3) (emphasis added).  The
Ninth Circuit, therefore, recognizes the value of preparation for particular judges; reduction in
the number of possible panels would give counsel more of a realistic opportunity to know how
particular judges might interact in a panel setting.
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accounts for 60% of case filings in the Ninth Circuit.183  California’s
district courts produced 21,789 of the 36,953 civil filings within the
circuit in 1995 and 1680 of the 2891 habeas petitions filed.184  With the
population of California projected to increase more than 50% in the
next 30 years,185 there is no foreseeable reduction in the rate of case
filings in California’s district courts absent a Congressional reduction
in federal-court jurisdiction, which seems highly unlikely.186  These
district court filings will indubitably lead to a steady stream of ap-
peals to the Ninth Circuit; thus, any effort to ameliorate the caseload
crisis must be primarily concerned with how to cope with the volume
of cases coming to the court from California.  The vast majority of
proposals to modify the Ninth Circuit have failed to take this para-
mount concern into account.  The next section will analyze these ef-
forts and select the one which best addresses the problem presented
by California.
III.  THE SOLUTION
Those who wish to create or maintain jumbo courts do so for a vari-
ety of reasons.  Some are members of the jumbo court itself.  The
court is their Edsel, so it’s okay.  Presumably, they believe that if
they try hard enough to make the jumbo court work, it will work.
Unfortunately, the most determined elephant will never leap like a
gazelle.  We must recognize the fallacy and extravagance of relying
on expansion to fulfill our judiciary’s essential missions.  As many
segments of corporate America have learned the hard way, such an
approach fails in the long run.187
A. Possible Reconfigurations
When evaluating proposals to split a federal circuit court of ap-
peals, one must consider the historical context in which the courts
developed.  In an oft-cited passage of their 1973 report, the members
of the Hruska Commission stated that the geographical boundaries of
the circuit courts “are largely the result of historical accident.”188  This
183. See O’Scannlain, supra note 14, at 318 (citing 1993 and 1994 case filings statistics).
California accounts for nearly 9% of all case filings in the federal appellate system.  See
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 12, at 106.
184. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 12, at 148-49.
185. See El Nasser, supra note 18, at 7A.
186. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
187. Tjoflat, supra note 31, at 73.
188. See Hruska Commission Report, supra note 10, at 228.
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somewhat overstates the role of chance; perhaps it is better to charac-
terize the development of circuit boundaries as “temporal geographi-
cal necessity.” The boundaries evolved as they did for many reasons,
including the need for compact areas within which circuit-riding for
the Supreme Court was (initially) plausible; the westward and south-
ward expansion of the nation; and concerns of federalism, which dic-
tated the need for federal courts that, although decentralized, could
address national concerns in a more local context in the growing na-
tion.189
When one considers circuit boundaries in their historical context,
it becomes harder to dismiss them.  Although concerns such as cir-
cuit-riding have given way to more modern views of judicial admini-
stration, respect for the relationships that develop over time among
judges, advocates, and litigants in the context of an implicit reliance
upon circuit stability demands thorough consideration of any pro-
posal to change those relationships.190
One common proposal for revision of the Ninth Circuit, that of
making California its own circuit, is not viable for a number of rea-
sons.  First, such a circuit (commonly called the “horsecollar” con-
figuration because the remaining contiguous states would surround
California like a horsecollar) would not comport with notions of fed-
eralism, which promote diversity.  The judges in the California circuit
would most likely be from California; this could create a circuit lack-
ing in the viewpoints of judges who had lived and practiced in other
states.191  In addition, the two senators from California, by virtue of
their key role as consultants in the appointments process, would be in
a position to shape an entire court of appeals for an indeterminate
length of time.192  It is also doubtful that a proposal which would give
one state so much judicial clout would ever pass through both houses
of Congress.
A second approach (introduced by Senator Gorton of Washing-
ton and Senator Burns of Montana as Senate Bill 948 in 1989) would
have created a Twelfth Circuit of Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands,
189. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
190. The Hruska Commission did recognize this point: “Except for the most compelling
reasons, we are reluctant to disturb institutions which have acquired not only the respect but
the loyalty of their constituents.”  Hruska Commission Report, supra note 10, at 228.
191. See id. at 237.
192. See id.
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leaving Arizona, California, and Nevada in the Ninth Circuit.193
While this configuration had some regional appeal in that it kept
states grouped together geographically, it did not distribute the
caseload evenly.  According to 1995 statistics, this plan would have
split the caseload among the states in the following manner:194
Thus most of the appeals remain in the Ninth Circuit, with fewer
judges to handle 73% of the current caseload, while the Twelfth Cir-
cuit would be comparatively underworked.  Senate Bill 948 died in
committee.
Similar problems arise when one considers the Senate’s most re-
cent attempt to split the circuit, which has become known as the
“hopscotch” circuit because Arizona borders no other state in the
Twelfth Circuit proposed by this plan, thus litigants would have to
193. See S. 948, 101st Cong. (1989).
194. All statistics in the forthcoming tables come from JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 12,
at 102.  They do not include original proceedings or appeals from the bankruptcy and tax
courts, the NLRB, or administrative agencies, which together comprised 17% of all proceed-
ings in the Ninth Circuit in 1995.  See id.
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hop over Nevada, a Ninth Circuit state, to get to and from Arizona.195
The hopscotch circuit’s appellate caseload would break down as fol-
lows:
This plan does little to solve the caseload problem.  By grouping
California, Nevada, and the islands in one circuit, sixty percent of the
caseload remains in the newly-configured Ninth Circuit, virtually all
of which comes from California.  Indeed, judges of the Twelfth Cir-
cuit would have to handle 239 cases per year, while judges of the
Ninth Circuit would average 363 cases.196
The hopscotch plan also calls for two new “co-equal” headquar-
ters (which would require the construction of new courthouses) in
Phoenix and Seattle.197  This would cost the taxpayers millions of
195. Ninth Circuit Judge David R. Thompson of San Diego dismissed this part of the plan
as “idiotic,” and Circuit Judge Mary Schroeder of Phoenix denounced the hopscotch plan as a
“‘silly’ response to the alleged problems of slow decisionmaking.”  David G. Savage, Debate
Rises Over Proposal to Break Up Appeals Court: Senate Republicans Call Region ‘Huge and
Unwieldly’, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1997, at A3.
196. See Carl Tobias, Justice and the Ninth Circuit, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1997, at A19.
197. See William A. Rusher, Splitting the Ninth Circuit, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 20, 1997,
at 15B.
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dollars, money that could be saved by dividing California and using
the current courthouses in San Francisco and Pasadena as headquar-
ters for the newly-configured circuits.198
In 1995, Senators Gorton and Burns tried again, introducing
Senate Bill 956, which originally proposed what is called the
“icebox”199 circuit because it would create a new Twelfth Circuit con-
sisting of the northern states of the current Ninth Circuit.200  The
caseload breakdown would have looked like this:
There are numerous problems with this bill, not the least of
which lies in the fact that it seems to be motivated by the desire to
create a circuit for the Pacific Northwest.  Senator Gorton has stated
that the Ninth Circuit is “dominated by California judges and Cali-
fornia judicial philosophy” and has invoked environmental concerns
indigenous to the region as a reason to create a circuit for the Pacific
Northwest because “the interests of the Northwest cannot be fully
198. See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
199. See O’Scannlain, supra note 14, at 317.
200. See 141 CONG. REC. S7505 (daily ed. May 25, 1995).
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appreciated . . . from a California perspective.”201  Such concerns
seem to miss the point of national courts of appeals: While regional
division of courts of appeals is a byproduct of federalism, such re-
gionalism reflects a need for a decentralized system for the mainte-
nance of a national perspective on the law, not a forum for protection
of regional concerns under the aegis of federalism.
Another problem with the bill is its grossly uneven division of
the appellate docket; the bill was revised due to concerns expressed
at Congressional hearings over the inequitable split of cases between
the circuits.  The revised bill looked like this:
This configuration, called the “string bean approach” was re-
ported favorably out of the House Judiciary Committee by an 11-7
vote on December 7, 1995.202  At first glance, it appears to improve
the caseload situation over the horsecollar and icebox approaches
201. 141 CONG. REC. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton).  Some
have gone so far as to label proposals for a Pacific Northwest circuit “environmental gerry-
mandering.”  See Carl Tobias, The Proposal to Split the Ninth Circuit, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 547, 549 (1996).
202. See Burns, supra note 9, at 249.
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due to the more even 58-42% split.  However, as Senator Feinstein
noted during debate on Senate Bill 956, this approach would create a
Ninth Circuit in which California would contribute 94% of the
caseload, thus raising similar concerns to those engendered by the
horsecollar configuration.203  This arrangement satisfactorily ad-
dressed the problem of caseload distribution, but a circuit dominated
so completely by one state would hardly assuage concerns about fed-
eralism and diversity.  There are additional efficiency problems with
such a circuit: as Senator Feinstein and Judge O’Scannlain point out,
this Twelfth Circuit would be headquartered in Phoenix, which would
require not only construction expenditures between $23 and $59 mil-
lion, but would also require judges sitting in Fairbanks, Alaska, to
make regular trips to Phoenix; this would be wasteful in terms of time
and resources.204  As Professor Carrington pointed out in a letter to
the Senate Judiciary Committee:
Everyone . . . has assumed that any split of the Ninth Circuit
would follow geographic boundaries . . . . There is no administrative
convenience, or convenience of litigants to be served by a court ex-
tending from Tucson to Fairbanks.  The 12th Circuit as envisioned
would still be a jumbo circuit, far too large to assure any of the ad-
vantages one might hope to secure by having a smaller court of ap-
peals.205
Given the difficulties inherent in such a proposal, the Senate acted
wisely in choosing not to enact the stringbean approach.206
The final and most logical of the major approaches to the divi-
sion of the Ninth Circuit remains the proposal submitted by the
Hruska Commission in 1973.  This proposal would create a Twelfth
Circuit consisting of Arizona, Nevada, and the Southern and Central
Districts of California.207  The Ninth Circuit would consist of Alaska,
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Hawaii, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands (added to the circuit after the Report was pub-
203. See 142 CONG. REC. S2221 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996) (comments of Sen. Feinstein); see
also supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
204. See id.; O’Scannlain, supra note 14, at 317.
205. Letter from Paul D. Carrington, Professor of Law, Duke University, to the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 21, 1996), quoted in Hug, supra note 132, at 307-08.
206. See 142 CONG. REC. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
207. See Hruska Commission Report, supra note 10, at 236.
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lished)208 and the Northern and Eastern Districts of California.209  This
configuration would break the caseload down as follows:
This scheme was introduced in Congress by Representative Mi-
chael Kopetski of Oregon as House Bill 3654, entitled the “Ninth
208. The Northern Mariana Islands were, however, included in the Ninth Circuit under the
version of the Hruska Commission’s plan introduced by Rep. Kopetski.  See 139 CONG. REC.
E3046 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993) (statement of Rep. Kopetski).  For a more detailed discussion
of the Hruska/Kopetski plan, see infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text, and for a map, see
infra Appendix.
209. See Hruska Commission Report, supra note 10, at 236.  Here is one blunt statement of
the problem:
Because the State of California comprises 10 percent of the national population
and . . . alone generates two-thirds of the judicial business of the present ninth circuit,
the Commission concluded that the only feasible redefinement [sic] of States within
the Ninth Circuit must include a division of the four judicial districts in California be-
tween the two new circuits in the west.
Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 1188, 1190 (1974) [hereinafter Hellman, Legal Problems] (quoting 120 CONG.
REC. 22,610 (1974) (statement of Sen. Burdick)).
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Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1993.”210  The bill
was introduced at the end of the session and was not revived at the
next session.  It deserves to be revived and to be given strong consid-
eration.  The principal advantage of the Hruska/Kopetski plan over
the other proposals to divide the Ninth Circuit is that it meets the
caseload crisis with the only real means of solving it: by dividing Cali-
fornia.211  This plan creates a virtually even split in the caseload be-
tween the Ninth and Twelfth Circuits.212
The division of California is both the principal advantage and
most controversial feature of the Hruska plan, and was perhaps the
most hotly debated Ninth Circuit issue at the Hruska Commission
Hearings.213  It is true that the plan would entail the first split of a
state between circuits; the size of California’s caseload has, however,
made this the only viable alternative.  Criticisms of the one-state,
two-circuit approach center upon the obvious possibility that the two
circuits could construe California law differently, thus creating equal
protection implications for litigants in the two circuits.214  There are
several ways to combat these perceived problems.
210. See 139 CONG. REC. E3046 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1993) (statement of Rep. Kopetski).
211. It would, of course, be naive to neglect to mention that Rep. Kopetski hails from Ore-
gon, which could open his bill up to attacks of regionalism since the Pacific Northwestern states
are kept together by the Hruska alignment.  Rep. Kopetski responded to this challenge in the
following passage:
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I want to emphasize that this bill is not motivated out of a de-
sire to split the Northwest, particularly Oregon and Washington, from California in
an attempt to affect substantive legal opinions.  In fact, the bill would include north-
ern California in the ninth circuit.  The only motivation behind the introduction of
the bill is to remove what has become an impediment to the swift and uniform ad-
ministration of the law for all those currently under the ninth circuit.
Id.
One argument against Kopetski’s explanation of his motive is that northern California
has some significant interests (timber, for example) in common with the Pacific Northwest.
However, the significant caseload relief afforded by the plan and the fact that it was originally
conceived by a bipartisan, non-regionally-affiliated commission serve more than adequately to
defend the Hruska/Kopetski realignment against such criticism.  See Hruska Commission Re-
port, supra note 10, at 224 (listing membership of the Commission).
212. It is significant to note that had the Hruska plan been enacted in 1973, the caseload
division would have been roughly 55% in the Twelfth Circuit and 45% in the Ninth Circuit.
Thus, the caseload division grew closer to 50-50 in the years between 1973 and 1995.
213. See Hruska Commission Report, supra note 10, at 238-40.
214. Such an equal protection argument could arise if a litigant lost an appeal because the
Ninth Circuit ruled unconstitutional the state law upon which his case relied while the Twelfth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the same law in a separate case.  The Ninth Circuit liti-
gant could claim that his equal protection right was violated because he was similarly situated
to the Twelfth Circuit litigant, yet he lost his appeal based upon the Ninth Circuit’s contrary
interpretation of the same statute upheld in the Twelfth Circuit.  In the absence of some inter-
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1. Hruska Approach.  The Hruska Commission relied on
already-existing methods in its proposed solutions for potential
intercircuit difficulties.  Pointing out correctly that there were already
(and continue to be) four federal district courts applying California
law without major detriment to litigants, the Commission suggested
that questions of state law arising in the new circuits could be
certified to the California Supreme Court.215  Such certification could
be interlocutory so as to avoid final federal adjudication before
resolution by California’s highest court.216  This certainly seems like a
viable solution even today.217
Another issue addressed by the Commission was the possibility
of forum-shopping by litigants between the circuits.218  Again, this is
not a novel problem, as opportunities for forum-shopping already
exist in the federal courts.219  Weapons available to combat forum-
shopping include venue restrictions and transfer provisions, which
could be tightened by Congress if the circuit split caused a significant
rise in forum-shopping.220
An additional concern expressed at hearings before the Hruska
Commission was the possibility of conflicting orders to state agencies
from the two circuits.221  However, 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(4) provides for
circuit means of resolving this inconsistency, this litigant’s claim would be brought either to the
Ninth Circuit sitting en banc (which might deny hearing or hear the case and then simply affirm
its three-judge panel’s version of the statute’s constitutional status, thus leaving the inconsis-
tency unresolved) or to the United States Supreme Court, where the chances of it being heard
would be slim at best and, even if it was heard, substantial delay would inhere in the process.
215. See Hruska Commission Report, supra note 10, at 239.
216. See id.
217. This solution would require the California legislature to pass a rule enabling federal
courts to certify questions to its supreme court.  Such rules are common in the United States,
even within the Ninth Circuit (Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington all have such
rules). See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4248 & n.30 (1988); see also, e.g., IDAHO APP. R. 12.1 (West 1996) (allowing for
federal courts to certify questions of Idaho law to the Idaho Supreme Court in the absence of
controlling precedent when a determination would “materially advance” the resolution of the
federal case).
Certification raises concerns with respect to delays in adjudication, the very problem
that dividing California sets out to solve.  The fact that this would be a new procedure would
enable the legislature to develop a more stream-lined process than those found in other states.
In any event, the overall beneficial effect that the split will have on the time necessary for ap-
pellate adjudication will more than compensate for any slowdown inherent in a certification
procedure.




GRIBBIN1 06/04/98  1:33 PM
1997] CALIFORNIA SPLIT 393
transfer and consolidation of parallel matters at the appellate level;
cases involving the same order of a state agency are consolidated at
the court where the first appeal was filed.222
2. Kopetski Bill.  The Kopetski bill provides for an intercircuit en
banc comprised of the judges of the Ninth and Twelfth Circuits to
“convene as necessary” to address any inconsistent applications of
federal law between the two circuits.223  It is unclear whether this
court would also address conflicts as to state law.224  The process for
convening an intercircuit en banc is identical to that required for an
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(4) (1994).
223. H.R. 3654, 103d Cong. § 3 (1993).  Kopetski appears to have based this proposal upon
an identical suggestion in Hellman’s work.  See Hellman, Legal Problems, supra note 209, at
1271-74 (explaining his proposal to allow certain cases to be heard by two courts of appeals sit-
ting together en banc).  This suggestion creates the possibility of a 28-judge en banc hearing,
which, as has already been demonstrated, would be difficult to convene.  See supra notes 156-
58, 164 and accompanying text.  Consequently, such hearings would possibly occur infre-
quently.  As Ninth Circuit Judge Ben C. Duniway wrote in a letter to then-Attorney General
William B. Saxbe (in response to concerns expressed by Robert Bork, when he was Acting At-
torney General, that there would be frequent conflicts between the Ninth and proposed
Twelfth Circuits as to California law):
With the greatest respect for Mr. Bork, the fears expressed in his letter remind me of
the ancient Scottish prayer which goes:  “From ghoulies and ghosties and long-leggity
beasties and things that go bump in the night, Good Lord deliver us.”  Based upon
my experience of more than twelve years as a member of the Court . . . , I think that
the problems that Mr. Bork foresees are in the category of “things that go bump in
the night.”  They are not real.
Letter from Judge Ben C. Duniway to Attorney General William B. Saxbe (Feb. 8, 1974), re-
printed in Hellman, Legal Problems, supra note 209, at 1203 n.61.
An alternative to the 28-judge en banc would be a smaller panel, perhaps consisting of
the five most senior judges and the four most junior.  See, e.g., Hellman, Legal Problems, supra
note 209, at 1273 (discussing a similar proposal).  However, this runs into the aforementioned
problems of the mini en banc, in which fewer than the total number of judges decides a crucial
issue.  See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.  For this reason, the full en banc seems to
be the best, if most cumbersome, solution.  Its infrequent application and the administrative
advantages inherent in the smaller circuits should make it more feasible than the current full en
banc procedure.
224. A curious feature, noted earlier, of the debate over splitting California is the amount
of concern expressed, by those who oppose the division, about the possibility that the two cir-
cuits would construe California law differently.  See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text;
see also Hruska Commission Report, supra note 10, at 238-39 (addressing these concerns).
Such concern is unwarranted, because all of the circuits could be called upon from time to time
to construe California law; the four federal district courts in California do so every day.  In any
event, federal interpretation of state law technically has no precedential effect.  Federal courts
are to construe the law of California as would the state’s supreme court—it is the state courts
whose interpretation of California law is binding.  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
78 (1938); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) (“The laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they ap-
ply.”).
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en banc in the present Ninth Circuit.  Litigants may request a
rehearing, but a judge must initiate a vote and a majority of the court
is required to convene an en banc.225  The bill emphasizes that such
hearings are to be held in exceptional cases only.226
The best resolution to concerns about intercircuit conflicts is an
amalgamation of the Hruska and Kopetski plans.  Such a fusion will
let existing mechanisms take care of as many state-law conflicts as
possible with certification to the California Supreme Court as a last
resort; the intercircuit en banc will serve as a tribunal for the resolu-
tion of conflicts involving federal law.  If certifications became too
burdensome for the California Supreme Court, a new court could be
created to hear such appeals, perhaps composed of retired California
judges, law professors, or other experts in state law.227  The intercir-
cuit en banc would be convened seldom enough to avoid overbur-
dening the judges of the newly configured circuits.
Another advantage of the Hruska/Kopetski plan is its creation of
an even split in judgeships.  The plan would create fourteen judge-
ships in the Twelfth and fourteen in the Ninth.228  The icebox and
stringbean plans each create one large, unwieldy circuit and one small
circuit.  The large circuit in each plan has too many judges to operate
effectively, thus replicating, rather than reducing, the overcrowded
bench of the current Ninth Circuit.229
A significant argument that can be levied against this approach is
that it merely redistributes judges between two circuits, with the
same number of filings per judgeship, and thus solves no real prob-
lems.  Such an argument fails to take into account, however, the in-
herent benefits of a smaller circuit which offset this redistributive ef-
fect.  The administrative apparatus of the new circuits will be half of
that which the current Ninth Circuit carries.  Appeals are therefore
less likely to be caught in the bureaucratic delays inherent in an or-
ganization as large as the current circuit.  Judges will travel shorter
distances, enabling panels to hear appeals at a greater pace.  The
Fifth Circuit split is instructive on this point.  In 1995 (with only three
225. See H.R. 3654, § 3.
226. See id.
227. A constitutional question would arise from the creation of such a tribunal: Would its
members need to be Article III judges, sitting for life?  A possible answer is that they could be
Article I judges (along the lines of Bankruptcy judges) with 15-year tenures.
228. See H.R. 3654, § 2.
229. The horsecollar approach, of course, suffers from problems of diversity, rather than
size, of the bench.  See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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judgeships added since 1980), the combined Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits terminated more than two times as many appeals as did the
former Fifth Circuit in 1980, its last year of operation.230
Smaller circuits also remove many of the obstacles to the en banc
process. Fourteen judges are more easily assembled in a panel than
are twenty-eight judges, and the procedure becomes more adminis-
tratively feasible as petitions and memoranda need circulate through
fewer hands in order to prepare for a vote on an en banc hearing.  To
be sure, the en banc would remain a time- and resource-intensive
process even in smaller circuits, but reductions in judgeships to four-
teen per circuit bring the en banc mechanism more into the realm of
possibility than the notion of an assembly of twenty-eight judges.
The newly-constituted circuits would fall short of the fifteen-judge
minimum prescribed by Congress for mini en banc eligibility; there is
no provision in the Hruska/Kopetski plan for a request to Congress
to relax this limitation.  The plan is designed to preclude use of the
mini en banc in the Ninth and Twelfth Circuits.
Individual justice for appellants would also be enhanced by the
smaller circuits created by the Hruska/Kopetski plan.  The plan fos-
ters collegiality among the judges by reducing the possible number of
panels by half, thus increasing the odds that judges will work together
on multiple appeals.  The time-saving elements of the plan will en-
gender speedier disposition of appeals without compromising the ca-
pacity of judges to pay more attention to the details of each case.  In
smaller circuits, there will be less need for total delegation of, for ex-
ample, decisions concerning publication of opinions.  Shorter disposi-
tion times will also reduce the overall cost of appeals for litigants.231
A final common criticism of plans to split the Ninth Circuit is
that construction of new Circuit headquarters would cost taxpayers
enormous sums.  One of Chief Judge Hug’s main arguments against
division is that Congress has already approved, and construction has
almost been completed on, “an extensive post-earthquake rehabilita-
tion of the historic Ninth Circuit headquarters building in San Fran-
230. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
231. Improvement of appellate justice may have the ironic effect of increasing the number
of appeals as more potential appellants feel they have access to the system via lower costs and
higher predictability.  While a curious byproduct of an effort to alleviate a caseload crisis, the
improvement of justice can hardly be regarded as a negative effect of reform.  Overall im-
provements in the ability of the circuits to handle appeals in a timely manner should make it
possible for them to absorb better any increase in new filings.
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cisco at a cost of over $100 million.”232  The Hruska/Kopetski plan
solves this problem by retaining the newly-refurbished headquarters
building in San Francisco and using the large Ninth Circuit court-
house at Pasadena as headquarters for the new Twelfth Circuit.233
Even the most vociferous opponents of splitting California ac-
knowledge that this is probably the most realistic way to solve the
caseload problem: Professor Tobias, who frequently writes about the
federal courts and opposes a split of the Ninth Circuit, said recently:
“No one really thinks it’s a good idea to divide up California, but
then no one has a good answer how to do it otherwise.”234  Even Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee Chairman Hatch, in denouncing what he
perceived as further delay which would be caused by Senator Fein-
stein’s final proposal for a study commission, said that he “believe[s]
there will be a split of California if we go this route.”235
IV. CONCLUSION
The history of the United States Courts of Appeals is one char-
acterized by bitter struggle in Congress and gradual, measured
change.  Seldom has any major change in the courts of appeals (and
the old circuit courts before them) been enacted without years of
wrangling and dealmaking among legislators.  The courts of appeals,
particularly the Ninth Circuit, find themselves at a crossroads again:
The Commission proposed by the House of Representatives, if in-
deed it is ever impaneled, will be charged with recommending the
changes that need to be made to ease the overburdened Ninth Cir-
cuit.
Those who wish to see effective change enacted in the Ninth Cir-
cuit by the turn of the century should hope that the House Commis-
sion arrives at the same conclusion that the Hruska Commission
reached before it: California is the problem, and it must be divided.
This is the only way truly to solve the caseload crisis, and the prob-
lems of delay and lack of collegiality, and to preserve stability in the
application of the law.236  The controversial hopscotch plan recently
232. Hug, supra note 132, at 309.
233. See O’Scannlain, supra note 14, at 318.
234. Savage, supra note 195, at A3.
235. Whitney, supra note 22, at A1.
236. All Ninth Circuit precedent passed down before the official date of division of the cir-
cuit (or within a suitable period after the division) should be binding upon the new Twelfth Cir-
cuit.  The Eleventh Circuit pursued a similar course of action following the division of the old
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proposed by the Senate would do little to address the issues underly-
ing the Ninth Circuit’s difficulties, principally the problem of Califor-
nia.
The process of reaching consensus to split the Ninth Circuit will
be a long one.  The majority of the judges of the circuit as well as the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Council currently oppose a split.237  But the re-
sistance may be starting to crack.  Judge O’Scannlain has endorsed
the Hruska plan,238 and the latest Congressional proposal for dividing
the circuit,239 although seriously flawed, survived the Senate.240
The creation of a commission would be an important step toward
ultimate division of the Ninth Circuit; it is troublesome, however,
that the Hruska Commission recommended the best solution twenty-
four years ago and nothing was done.  Study commissions are popular
Congressional compromises and, while often useful, they are also
popular delay tactics.  A study is completed, all sing its praises,
nothing is enacted and the topic is forgotten.  Chief Judge Hug, deftly
summarizing the federal appellate mission, recently stated that “a
principal purpose of federal appellate courts [is] to reduce the impact
of local and regional parochialism by providing a federalizing func-
tion over a substantial geographic area.”241  The Ninth Circuit has
simply grown too big to perform this function adequately.  Those
seeking justice within its jurisdiction should hope that Congress
breaks with its tradition of procrastination in matters of appellate
structure long enough to realize that the time has come to enact the
Hruska Commission’s remarkably prescient recommendations.
Fifth Circuit.  See Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(adopting as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981).
237. See Hug, supra note 132, at 305.
238. See O’Scannlain, supra note 14, at 318-19.
239. See S. 1022, 104th Cong. (1997).
240. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
241. Hug, supra note 132, at 308.
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APPENDIX
CONFIGURATION OF THE NINTH AND TWELFTH CIRCUITS
UNDER THE HRUSKA/KOPETSKI PLAN
Note: The Northern Mariana Islands (not pictured) would be part of the Ninth Circuit.
Source: 62 F.R.D. 250 (1973).
